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The paper estimates the impact of the South African Child Support Grant (CSG) 
on  child  health,  nutrition  and  education.  Data  from  the  2008  South  African 
National  Income  Dynamics  Study  (NIDS)  are  used.  Two  non-experimental 
treatment evaluation techniques, both relying on propensity scores, are applied to 
six  different  outcome  variables.  Using  propensity  score  matching  with  a  binary 
outcome  variable,  no  convincing  evidence  of  improvements  on  any  of  the 
outcome variables is found. A second technique is therefore also applied, using a 
generalised  form  of  the  propensity  scores.  This  follows  the  approach  of  Hirano 
and Imbens (2004) and Agüero et al. (2009). The generalised approach estimates 
a positive treatment effect for children’s height-for-age and progress through the 
school  system.  Although  these  estimates  do  provide  some  evidence  of  the 
positive effect of the Child Support Grant on the lives of children, the estimates 
are  small  and  do  not  provide  clear  evidence  that  the  transfers  received  by 
caregivers are spent mainly on improving the well-being of beneficiary children. 
Some  potential  and  plausible  explanations  for  this  result  are  discussed  in  the 
paper.  Nevertheless,  the  findings  seem  to  suggest  that  some  of  the  cash 
transferred through the Child Support Grant appears to be spent on improving the 
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1.  Introduction 
Anti-poverty programme evaluation has received increasing attention in the recent past as 
various stakeholders have demanded answers on whether these programmes are successful 
in  what  they  set  out  to  achieve  (Ravallion,  2007:  3787).  Evaluating  these  programmes 
involves  some  form  of  treatment  evaluation,  i.e.  a  comparison  between  the  outcomes  of 
individuals (be it children, adults, households or communities) who are participating in the 
programme  (also  referred  to  as  “the  treated”)  versus  those  who  are  not.
1  This  type  of 
evaluation is, however, no easy task, as data on a suitable control group (or counterfactual) 
are  not  always  available,  leading  to  biased  estimates  of  the  effect  of  anti-poverty 
programmes.  It  is  for  this  reason  that  a  wide  variety  of  estimation  techniques,  dealing 
specifically with solving the evaluation problem in the context of non-experimental data, have 
been developed. Techniques utilising propensity scores have been used repeatedly in this 
regard and offer a way in which to create a suitable counterfactual with which to compare 
outcomes. Under certain conditions, these techniques can provide unbiased estimates of the 
effect of a programme (Ravallion, 2007: 3805). 
In South Africa, as in many other developing countries, anti-poverty programmes are often 
aimed at improving the conditions of the most vulnerable part of society, i.e. the disabled, 
elderly and children. One such programme is the South African Child Support Grant (CSG), 
which  involves  an  unconditional  cash  transfer  to  eligible  caregivers  of  children,  who  are 
identified by way of a means test.   
Introduced  in  April  1998,  the  CSG  has  been  lauded  as  one  of  the  government’s  most 
successful anti-poverty interventions (see, for example, the recent report by UNICEF, 2009).  
This praise seems to be justified in light of the high take-up of the grant, with 9 351 977 
beneficiary children and 5 377 476 recipient caregivers as at the end of January 2010 (South 
African  Social  Security  Agency  (SASSA),  2010:  8,  9).  Furthermore,  commentators  have 
argued that the post-2000 decline in poverty levels is largely attributable to the introduction of 
this grant (Van der Berg, Burger and Louw, 2010, Leibbrandt, Woolard, Finn and Argent, 
2010:  65).  However,  the  CSG  is  administered  as  an  unconditional  grant,  i.e.  recipient 
caregivers have no obligations as far as spending the grant money is concerned. This raises 
questions as to the effectiveness of the grant, i.e. whether it is has any effect in improving of 
the lives of children. 
This paper focuses on answering this question by broadly following the methodology adopted 
by Agüero, Carter and Woolard (2009) in assessing the impact which the CSG has on the 
well-being of beneficiary children. Data from the National Income Dynamics Study (NIDS) are 
                                                 
1 The use of the terms “treatment” and ”treated” come from the medical sciences (Cameron & Trivedi, 
2005: 860), and makes more sense when used in that context. However, the term is used in this paper in 
conformity with the bulk of the literature on the subject.   
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used and two techniques, both relying on the use of propensity scores, are applied to identify 
the effect of the CSG on three groups of outcome variables. The outcome variables chosen 
are aimed at measuring children’s education, health and nutrition, as three indicators of the 
general well-being of children. The first technique, used as a baseline against which the final 
estimates  can  be  compared,  uses  binary  propensity  score  matching  (PSM).  The  second 
technique, being the focus of this paper, extends this binary estimate to take into account the 
fact that children have not all received the CSG for an equal period of their lives (i.e. the 
“dosage” of CSG received differs from child to child). The second technique, first developed 
by Hirano and Imbens (2005) and later applied by Agüero et al. (2009) is more appropriate in 
assessing the impact of the CSG, as it assumes that the treatment effect is dependent on the 
length of grant receipt. 
The  paper  finds  no  effect  on  the  selected  outcomes  when  applying  the  first  technique, 
namely binary propensity score matching. However, a positive, albeit small, effect on two of 
the selected outcomes is found when the effect is estimated with a continuous treatment 
variable.  Although  this  finding  does  not  provide  clear  evidence  that  the  CSG  transfers 
received by caregivers are spent mainly on improving the well-being of beneficiary children, it 
does  seem  to  suggest  that  some  of  the  cash  transferred  through  the  CSG  is  spent  on 
improving the well-being of children. In this sense the paper contributes to previous findings 
in the literature indicating a positive impact on the health, nutrition and education of children 
receiving the CSG. 
2.  Background to the South African Child Support Grant 
The CSG was introduced in 1998 as an alternative to the State Maintenance Grant (SMG), 
which was phased out as part of the South African Government’s reform of its social security 
system (Kruger, 1998: 3). This reform was aimed mainly at increasing the pool of recipients 
having access to the SMG. Receipt of the SMG was subject to a means test, and the grant 
was  aimed  only  at  parents  who  were,  for  a  number  of  reasons,  unable  to  rely  on  the 
assistance of a second parent (Kruger, 1998: 3). The SMG was, however, failing to reach the 
poorest segment of society, with Africans being almost entirely excluded from receiving any 
benefit from the SMG (Kruger, 1998: 3). The CSG, on the other hand, was introduced as a 
means-tested social grant, aimed specifically at the poorest 30% of children in South Africa, 
irrespective of race (Agüero et al., 2009: 5, Triegaardt, 2005: 249).   
The initial roll-out of the CSG involved a cash-transfer of R100 per month to the primary 
caregivers of all eligible children under the age of 7. The age limit has been raised several 
times to expand the coverage of the grant.
2 In response to the alleged success of the CSG, 
                                                 
2 The age limit was first increased to 9 years in April 2003, and was again raised to include all children 
under the age of 11 years in 2004. In April 2005, the age limit was increased to 14 years (McEwen et al., 
2009: 2).  
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the  age-limit  was  again  increased  to  16  years  from  January  2010,  and  will  gradually  be 
increased to include all eligible children under 18 years from January 2012 (Government of 
South Africa, 2009). The amount transferred to recipients has also increased over the period 
from April 1998, and is currently R250 (at the time of the NIDS survey, the amount was 
R210).
3 
The value set for the means test remained unchanged between 1998 and 2008, and was set 
at a monthly income amount received by the primary caregiver (whether single or married) of 
R800 in urban areas and R1 100 in rural areas. This was revised in October 2008 in line with 
inflation, and is currently calculated as 10 times the grant amount. The means test has also 
been amended to differentiate between single and married caregivers so that for married 
caregivers, the income threshold is doubled and the primary caregiver’s income is added to 
his/her spouse’s income (McEwen, Kannemeyer and Woolard, 2009: 2).  
The  CSG  is  currently  administered  as  an  unconditional  cash  transfer  programme  and 
requires nothing from the recipients as far as the use of the funds is concerned.
4 This feature 
of the CSG distinguishes it from other social grant programmes aimed at the alleviation of 
poverty affecting children, such as Mexico’s conditional cash transfer programme, Progressa 
(now Oportunidades). The conditions attached to Oportunidades are specifically aimed at 
improving future human capital; older children are required to attend school, while younger 
children  must  be  taken  to  clinics  on  a  regular  basis  for  health  and  nutritional  check-ups 
(Case, Hosegood and Lund, 2005:468). In addition, the cash transfers made in terms of 
Oportunidades are only made to women, who have been found to apply more resources 
under their control to the improvement of household nutrition as well as towards the health of 
the children in the household, compared to men.
5 
The absence of enforced conditions in the CSG programme raises the question whether the 
funds  transferred  to  recipients  have  any  effect  on  the  welfare  (more  specifically,  the 
educational,  nutritional  and  health  outcomes)  of  children.  The  sections  that  follow  are 
devoted to answering this question in a systematic and rigorous way.    
3.  An Overview of the Existing Literature 
The impact of unconditional cash transfer programmes in South Africa in the form of both the 
CSG as well as the state old age pension (OAP) has been widely researched. The studies 
have to a large extent focussed on the poverty-alleviating impacts of these transfers within 
                                                 
3 Eyal and Woolard (2010) provide a detailed account of the age-limit and grant amount from 1998 to 2010. 
4 It should be noted that a recent amendment of the relevant legislation incorporates a regulation stating 
that “the primary care giver must, every six months, submit to the [South African Social Security] Agency 
the child’s proof of school or educational institution attendance” (Government of South Africa, 2009). This 
condition holds for all children between the ages of 7 and 18 years. This condition is, however, not currently 
enforced in awarding the CSG. 
5 See Thomas (1990 and 1994) for examples of such findings.  
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the  context  of  three  broad  categories,  more  specifically  the  effect  on  labour  force 
participation, education, and child health and nutrition (Leibbrandt et al., 2010: 62).   
The  effect  of  the  CSG  and  OAP  on  the  labour  outcomes  of  individuals  within  recipient 
households  has  been  estimated  from  various  angles.  Bertrand,  Mullainathan  and  Miller 
(2003)  indicate  that  the  presence  of  an  age-eligible  individual  in  the  household  has  a 
significant negative effect on the amount of working hours and the employment rate of both 
prime-aged males  and females.  However,  this  result  is  sensitive  to  the  inclusion  of  non-
resident household members. Using the same data as Bertrand et al. (2003), Posel, Fairburn 
and Lund (2004) show that African women are significantly more likely to be migrant workers 
if they originally form part of a household in which the OAP is received, specifically when the 
pension recipient is female.  No such relationship is found for men.   
Posel et al. (2004) suggest that this positive effect of the OAP on labour participation might 
be because the CSG allows prime-age females to migrate in search of employment, leaving 
children in the care of older relatives. This suggestion is supported by Ardington, Case and 
Hosegood (2009), who find that prime-age adults are significantly more likely to be employed 
as migrant workers once an individual  within the household becomes age-eligible for the 
OAP. 
As  for  unemployed  individuals  within  such  households,  Klasen  and  Woolard  (2009)  find 
evidence that, for those individuals who are unable to find employment, social grants are a 
safety net informing the location decision of the unemployed individual. More specifically, 
unemployed individuals often choose to remain in rural areas in a household where the OAP 
is received. This has the adverse effect that it lures job-seeking individuals away from job 
markets to rural areas where employment opportunities are scarce. 
In  a  very  recent  paper,  Eyal  and Woolard  (2010)  estimate  the  effect  of  CSG  receipt  on 
participation in the labour market, unemployment conditional on labour market participation 
and employment status using a sample of African women aged 20 to 45. They find a positive 
relationship between receipt of the CSG and participation in the labour market, as well as 
probability of being employed. Women in receipt of the CSG who are participating in the 
labour market, are also found to be less likely to be unemployed. 
As for the effect on children’s education, various earlier studies have found a significantly 
positive effect on the education of children living in households that include OAP recipients 
(Lund,  1993,  May,  Atwood,  Ewang,  Lund,  Norton  and  Wentzel,  1998).  More  recently, 
Edmonds (2004) considers the effect of the OAP not only on school enrolment, but also child 
labour and finds that the presence of an age-eligible pensioner in the household increases 
school enrolment and decreases child labour.    
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Case et al. (2005) focus on the effects of the CSG and find further evidence of increased 
school-enrolment for children in receipt of the CSG compared to their older siblings who are 
not receiving the CSG. It is suggested that higher enrolment rates could be as a result of an 
increase  in  children’s  health  and  nutrition,  improving  school-readiness.  In  addition,  it  is 
plausible that the CSG income is used to pay tuition fees and other school-related expenses. 
As for child health and nutrition, Case (2001a & 2001b) find that the presence of a pension-
recipient in a household increases the height-for-age of African and Coloured children by 
approximately one standard deviation (between 3 to 5 centimetres), equivalent to almost 6 
month’s growth for children aged 0 to 6 in the sample. 
Duflo (2003) provides further insight into the intra-household dynamics of this positive effect 
of the OAP on child health and nutrition. She finds that effects of the cash received from the 
old-age pension has a significantly positive effect on the weight-for-height z-scores (WHZ)  
and height-for-age z-scores (HAZ)
6 for girls (but not boys) if the transfer were made to a 
female within the household.   
This paper follows the methodology of Agüero et al. (2009), where the impact of the CSG on 
the HAZ of children during the first 36 months of life is estimated, using the KwaZulu-Natal 
Income Dynamics Study (KIDS). The continuous treatment evaluation technique
7 is used, 
which provides for the fact that not all children in the sample received the treatment for the 
entire  36  months  under  study.  The  study  finds  significant  improvement  in  the  HAZ  for 
children receiving the CSG in comparison with children in the control group (Agüero et al., 
2009: 26). More specifically, the finding is that, while no gain can be detected for children 
who only received the CSG for 50% of the 36 months or less, a significant increase in HAZ 
can be found for all children receiving the CSG for a greater part than 50% of their first 36 
months, with a maximum gain recorded when treatment is received for three-quarters of the 
first 36 months.   
4.  Finding the Benefits -- the Choice of Outcome Variables 
The positive effect of adequate health and nutrition on economic development and poverty 
alleviation has been emphasised in the literature (Barro, 1996).
8 An array of measures for 
nutritional outcomes exist, however, this paper will focus on the standardised HAZ and WHZ.  
Both of these measures calculate the z-score (z) of each child, defined as the deviation of an 
individual’s  measure  (in  this  case  height  and  weight)  from  the  median  of  the  reference 
population,  standardised  by  the  standard  deviation  of  the  measure  within  the  reference 
population (World Bank, 2006). In the case of HAZ this is given by     
     
  
, where   is height 
                                                 
6 Described in detail in the next section. 
7 Described in further detail below. 
8 For a discussion of the literature relating health and nutrition to the increase in the standard of living, 
labour supply and income, refer to Strauss and Thomas (1998).  
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in cm, and     and    are respectively the mean height and the standard deviation of height, 
given age in years.
9 
Height-for-age serves as an accurate measure of the long-run health and nutritional well-
being of children, measuring the accumulated investment in children’s nutrition and health 
since birth. As set out in Duflo (2003: 12) and Agüero et al. (2009: 7), nutritional deficiencies 
causing  stunting,  especially  in  the  early  stages  of  a  child’s  life,  can  lead  to  permanent 
damage on a person’s health and productivity later in life. 
On the other hand, the weight-for-height measures the short-run nutritional status of the child 
(how well-fed the child is, given his/her height) (Duflo, 2003: 3). A lower than average WHZ is 
often as a result of temporary malnutrition, for example as a result of droughts, and may still 
be corrected as soon as sufficient nutrient intake is resumed (Duflo, 2003: 8). 
Food expenditure is also examined as an outcome and interpreted as a measure of health 
and nutrition. Food expenditure is measured as the total average monthly expenditure which 
is spent on food items per household. This outcome provides some indication of the relative 
importance  of  food  in  a  household  vis-à-vis  other  households  exhibiting  comparable 
observable  characteristics.  However,  its  many  shortcomings  have  been  well  documented 
(see, for example, Deaton, 1997). First, since the measurement thereof is dependent on the 
ex post recollection of expenditure per item by respondents in a survey, it is prone to error 
and at best results in noisy data. Food expenditure is also not an accurate measure of actual 
nutritional intake, as it does not provide an indication of the nutritional content and quality of 
the  food  purchased  or  the  food  actually  consumed  by  household  members  (rather  than 
wasted or served to guests)
10(Strauss & Thomas, 1998: 793). 
In addition, discrimination within the household makes it almost impossible to determine with 
certainty which proportion of the expenditure is allocated to children (Deaton, 1997: 223). As 
such, it is at best a measure at household level (rather than a child-specific measure as the 
rest of the outcomes listed here). Nevertheless, food expenditure provides some indication of 
the  changes  in  spending  behaviour  by  households  containing  recipients  of  the  grant, 
compared  to  those  which  do  not  contain  any  recipients  and  as  such  can  be  used  as  a 
measure of the impact of the CSG. 
The paper approaches the question of intra-household distribution of resources from another 
angle, investigating the dominance of expenditure on items that are bought exclusively for 
the  use  of  adults  in  the  households  (adult  goods).  Examples  include  men’s  or  women’s 
clothing, tobacco and alcohol (Deaton, 1997:227). In the current data, such a variable has 
                                                 
9 WHZ  on  the  other  hand  is  calculated  similarly  as      
     
  
,  where     is  weight,  and       and        are 
respectively the mean weight in kilograms and the standard deviation of weight, given height in cm. 
10  One  would,  however,  expect  food  wastage  to  be  less  in  the  households  eligible  for  the  CSG,  and 
therefore of interest for the current analysis.   
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been created using expenditure on alcohol and cigarettes (two items which are exclusively 
consumed by adults). It is argued that, if receipt of the CSG has a positive effect on the 
spending habits of the household, expenditure should be channelled away from these items 
towards items which are beneficial to the development of the children in the household such 
as food, healthcare and education. Similar caveats mentioned in relation to food expenditure 
apply to this variable as well. 
Both HAZ and WHZ have the advantage of overcoming most of the issues relating to the 
expenditure variables. Height, weight and age can be measured more accurately than food 
expenditure, requiring only that the physical recording of the measure be done without error.  
To reduce measurement error the fieldwork manual relating to the NIDS survey required all 
fieldworkers to take the height and weight measure of each child at least twice, and to repeat 
the  process  until  the  two  measures  did  not  differ  by  more  than  0.5  cm  or  0.5  kg.
11An 
evaluation of the data shows that this was done effectively, with differences above 0.5cm 
recorded for only approximately 1.7% of all children sampled, and differences above 0.5kg 
recorded for approximately 1.8% of all children sampled. Furthermore, birthdates were in 
most cases confirmed by the age on the child’s clinic (“Road to Health”) card. 
It should, however, be noted that a significant increase of children’s HAZ and WHZ as a 
result of the cash received from the CSG makes two assumptions: first, that there will not be 
any unwanted behavioural responses to the cash received (i.e. that it will be used by the 
recipient caregivers to purchase more food); and second, that it will be possible physically for 
the  children  receiving  the  food  to  absorb  the  additional  nutrients  and  transform  these 
nutrients  into  an  improved  nutritional  status  (Agüero  et  al.,  2009:  7).  If  either  of  these 
assumptions proves not to hold true for the treated children in the sample, it will be more 
complicated to gauge the effect of the CSG. 
In addition to these measures, children’s school attendance is used as a measure of the 
effect of the CSG on education. However, since near-universal primary school enrolment has 
been observed for South Africa (UNICEF 2010),
12 the effect of the CSG in this area might be 
limited. An alternative measurement of school attainment is therefore also used in this paper, 
namely  whether  a  child  has  ever  repeated  a  grade  or  not.  This  measure  captures  the 
educational attainment of a child, rather than just measuring whether he/she attends school. 
It may also provide an indication of parental support and how conducive the child’s living 
conditions and social environment are to learning. 
Not only are these outcomes in line with the literature in this field, but also accord with the 
general purpose of the policy underlying the CSG. Although the CSG is administered as a 
conditional cash transfer programme, conditions regarding proper nutrition, health care and 
                                                 
11 See Agüero et al. (2009: 8) for a similar discussion of the KIDS data.  
12 In the data used in this paper, the school enrolment rate is approximately 99%.  
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school  enrolment  of  beneficiary  children  were  included  in  the  initial  regulations 
accompanying the relevant legislation (Leatt & Budlender, 2007).
13 In assessing the success 
of the CSG, it is therefore important to evaluate the effect of the CSG on these outcomes.   
While there are caveats pertaining to each of the above outcome variables individually, the 
set of outcomes covers an extensive range of the dimensions of child well-being and welfare 
when considered collectively. This set of outcomes outlined in the paragraphs above has 
been selected to provide a wide lens through which we can study how the CSG impacts 
various aspects and features of the lives of poor adults and children.  
5.  The Data 
The data used in this paper come from the National Income Dynamics Study (NIDS), which is 
the first wave of what will become a panel dataset. The survey, which was completed during 
2008, incorporates data on some 7 305 households, containing 31 170 household members 
as well as data on 9 336 children under the age of 14 years. It also includes data from a 
variety  of  questions  aimed  at  increasing  the  existing  information  on  the  receipt  of  social 
assistance by South Africans (McEwen et al., 2009: 1). 
At the outset, it is useful to examine the data in order to ascertain how effectively the CSG is 
targeted. This can be done by examining the number of eligible children (identified in terms 
of both their age and the means test) receiving the grant as well as those not in receipt of the 
grant. Both of these groups are important to illustrate the errors of inclusion (i.e. the group of 
individuals  who  are  not  eligible,  but  nevertheless  receive  the  grant)
14  and  the  errors  of 
exclusion (i.e. the group of individuals who are eligible, but do not receive the grant).   
For the purpose of evaluating the effect of receiving the CSG on the health, nutritional and 
educational outcomes of children, the latter group (i.e. children who have not received the 
CSG though being eligible to receive it, based on their age and the means test) is important 
as  a  potential  counterfactual,  as  one  would  expect  this  group  to  be  more  similar  to  the 
treated group in terms of background characteristics than the group of untreated, non-eligible 
children.   
Using the means test as it was applied during 2008 (the time at which the NIDS survey was 
conducted)
15, a simple simulation of the number of children receiving the CSG versus the 
number of children eligible for receiving CSG is conducted in order to get an initial indication 
of the targeting of the CSG. The algorithm used to identify eligible children is based on the 
                                                 
13 These conditions were later removed from the legislation and re-introduced only as non-enforceable 
conditions (Leatt & Budlender, 2007). 
14 One possible reason for the existence of this group is the fact that the means test is only administered at 
the time when the grant is first applied for (McEwen et al., 2009: 5). 
15During the time of the survey used in this paper, the age limit was set at 14 years (i.e. all eligible children 
under the age of 14).  
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income, age and caregiver data provided in NIDS. A detailed description thereof is included 
in Appendix A. 
Table 1 applies this algorithm of eligibility to the data to highlight the fact that there are both 
errors of inclusion and errors of exclusion in the implementation of the grant. Although smaller 
than  the  group  of  eligible  individuals  rightfully  receiving  the  CSG,  there  seem  to  be 
approximately 2 million children who are eligible for the CSG but not in receipt of the CSG in 
2008. This figure is in the same region, although slightly less, than what has previously been 
reported  in  Woolard,  Hatting  and  Klasen  (2010:  15).  This  discrepancy  can,  however,  be 
explained by the fact that the figures reported in Woolard et al. (2010) are based only on age-
eligibility, and do not take into account the means test (presumably since it has not been 
possible  to  link  caregivers  and  their  income  to  specific  children  in  previous  datasets, 
something which NIDS has now made possible). 
 
Table 1: Number of children eligible for and receiving the CSG in 2008 
                              Receiving CSG 
Eligible  Yes  No  Total 
Yes  5 688 256  2 070 819  7 759 075 
No  1 939 688  3 574 010  5 513 698 
Total  7 627 944  5 644 829  13 272 773 
Source: NIDS (2008) 
 
Further interrogation of the NIDS data reveals the main reason why so many eligible children 
are not receiving the CSG. Figure 1 lists the main reasons for non-application by caregivers of 
eligible children. The administrative burden is listed as the main reason for these caregivers 
not applying. More worrying, however, is the fact that there seems to be a certain amount of 
apathy regarding the CSG displayed by the caregivers, with just over 14% of the caregivers 
indicating that they just “haven’t gotten round to it yet” and slightly less than 10% indicating 
that they just “couldn’t be bothered”.   
 
    
 
Figure 1: Main reason CSG was not applied for by eligible caregivers in the sample
 
The descriptive statistics per treatment status are listed in Table 2. For comparative purposes, 
receipt of the CSG is defined both as a binary (i.e. receiving treatment or not) as well as 
continuous variable (the length of treatment, or “dosage” received). The continuous treatm
variable is defined as the percentage of a child’s life during which he/she received the CSG at
the time of the survey. This is calculated using the data on the month and year in which 
children  were  born  as  well  as  the  responses from  caregivers  regardi
receipt  of  the  CSG.  The  group  of  treated  children  is  divided  into  terciles  based  on  the 
distribution  of  the  continuous  treatment  variable,  with  children  divided  in  accordance  with 
receiving either a low, medium or high dosage (a low 
for 0-34% of the child’s life, medium dosage as 34
untreated children is divided into two groups based on eligibility.
There are expected differences between the two untreated grou
Table 2). First, caregivers of untreated eligible children are more likely to be unemployed and 
married than the caregivers of children who do not qualify for the CSG. In addition, the child
level characteristics vary across the
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receipt of the CSG is defined both as a binary (i.e. receiving treatment or not) as well as 
continuous variable (the length of treatment, or “dosage” received). The continuous treatm
variable is defined as the percentage of a child’s life during which he/she received the CSG at
the time of the survey. This is calculated using the data on the month and year in which 
children  were  born  as  well  as  the  responses from  caregivers  regarding  the  initial  date of 
receipt  of  the  CSG.  The  group  of  treated  children  is  divided  into  terciles  based  on  the 
distribution  of  the  continuous  treatment  variable,  with  children  divided  in  accordance  with 
receiving either a low, medium or high dosage (a low dosage defined as receipt of the CSG 
34% of the child’s life, medium dosage as 34-67% and high as 67-100%). The group of 
untreated children is divided into two groups based on eligibility. 
There are expected differences between the two untreated groups (the last two columns of 
Table 2). First, caregivers of untreated eligible children are more likely to be unemployed and 
married than the caregivers of children who do not qualify for the CSG. In addition, the child
level characteristics vary across these two groups, with eligible untreated children being on 
average more than a year younger that non-eligible children (as a result of the age
criteria) and a slightly greater proportion of the children in the eligible group being female.  
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics by treatment and eligibility status 
Variable 
Treated  Not Treated 
Low  Medium  High 
All  Eligible  Not Eligible 
[0-34%)  [34-67%)  [67-100%] 
Outcomes             
HAZ  -0.60  -0.45  -0.32  -0.50  -0.48  -0.19 
  (1.34)  (1.30)  (1.40)  (1.37)  (1.33)  (1.37) 
WHZ  0.23  0.35  0.13  0.18  0.11  0.39 
  (1.76)  (1.59)  (1.36)  (1.48)  (1.49)  (1.46) 
Monthly household expenditure spent on food items
#  798.36  833.72  757.08  783.871  770.97  1763.50 
  (487.88)  (643.67)  (478.52)  (506.17)  (566.63)  (1290.08) 
Household expenditure on adult goods per adult[1] in the household#  22.79  24.89  26.72  22.49  32.67  182.20 
  (50.65)  (36.79)  (43.60)  (36.27)  (49.23)  (215.86) 
Proportion of children enrolled at school
##  0.99  0.99  0.98  0.99  0.99  0.99 
  (0.10)  (0.08)  (0.13)  (0.10)  (0.08)  (0.11) 
Proportion of children ever repeated school year
##  0.25  0.21  0.16  0.24  0.25  0.18 
  (0.44)  (0.41)  (0.37)  (0.43)  (0.43)  (0.38) 
Caregiver Characteristics             
Motivation  -0.24  -0.13  0.49  0.12  -0.42  - 
  (0.61)  (1.02)  (1.06)  (1.05)  (0.16)  - 
Delay in application (in days)  1180.10  832.43  298.94  705.72  2127.19  - 
  (863.63)  (549.06)  (246.27)  (638.99)  (1385.75)  - 
Proportion employed  0.16  0.15  0.18  0.15  0.07  0.46 
  (0.37)  (0.35)  (0.39)  (0.36)  (0.25)  (0.50) 
Proportion married  0.32  0.33  0.32  0.34  0.36  0.66 




Treated  Not Treated 
Low  Medium  High 
All  Eligible  Not Eligible 
[0-34%)  [34-67%)  [67-100%] 
Child Characteristics             
Age in years  7.35  6.58  5.44  6.90  6.21  7.44 
  (4.52)  (4.29)  (3.03)  (3.91)  (4.59)  (4.64) 
Proportion male  0.48  0.51  0.53  0.50  0.46  0.51 
  (0.50)  (0.50)  (0.50)  (0.50)  (0.50)  (0.50) 
Household Characteristics             
Proportion access to electricity  0.71  0.76  0.74  0.73  0.74  0.89 
  (0.45)  (0.43)  (0.44)  (0.44)  (0.44)  (0.31) 
Proportion access to piped water  0.61  0.61  0.59  0.56  0.58  0.86 
  (0.49)  (0.49)  (0.49)  (0.50)  (0.49)  (0.35) 
Proportion access to landline  0.09  0.08  0.08  0.08  0.12  0.29 
  (0.28)  (0.27)  (0.27)  (0.27)  (0.32)  (0.45) 
Proportion access to flush toilet  0.33  0.36  0.35  0.31  0.38  0.75 
  (0.47)  (0.48)  (0.48)  (0.46)  (0.49)  (0.43) 
Proportion female headed  0.59  0.52  0.56  0.57  0.58  0.30 
  (0.49)  (0.50)  (0.50)  (0.50)  (0.49)  (0.46) 
Per capita expenditure  411.38  492.10  409.44  393.19  475.02  2238.01 
  (415.04)  (613.58)  (478.78)  (459.16)  (838.90)  (2880.70) 
Notes: Mean values with standard deviation in parenthesis. 
#Treatment calculated at the household level. 




The last difference between these two groups relates to the household characteristics, with 
that of the untreated eligible sample on average indicative of worse living conditions than 
those  who  are  not  eligible.  Eligible  children  not  receiving  the  CSG  generally  belong  to 
households which are more likely to be female headed, less likely to have access to basic 
amenities  and  with  a  much  lower  per  capita  expenditure  (a  difference  of  approximately 
R1 763) than children who do not qualify for the grant.   
However, when comparing the observable characteristics of the treated group as a whole with 
that of the eligible untreated group (columns 5 and 6 of Table 2 respectively), it would appear 
that these two groups are much more similar. Untreated groups, in the form of rejected or 
tardy applicants, have in the past been used as a counterfactual to estimate the treatment 
effect (Agüero et al., 2009:11). Since caregivers in the eligible untreated group have not yet 
applied for the CSG, although they are eligible to apply, they may in a sense be classified as 
tardy applicants. In this sense, they potentially could be used as a counterfactual in estimating 
the treatment effect. 
Looking at the breakdown of the treated group into terciles based on the treatment dosage 
(columns 2, 3 and 4 of Table 2), it can be concluded that the differences in the observable 
characteristics of these three groups are mostly small and negligible.  
The fact that there is a difference between the age of children receiving the grant for a small 
proportion of their lives (7.35 years), those who have received a medium dosage (6.58 years) 
and those who have received a high dosage (5.44 years) could potentially be explained by 
the  way  in  which  extent  of  treatment  is  measured.  More  specifically,  since  the  extent  of 
treatment  is  measured  as  the  percentage  of  a  child’s  life  during  which  he/she  has  been 
receiving the CSG, older children who have been receiving the grant the same number of 
months  as  younger  children  will  automatically  fall  into  the  low  treatment  group,  as  the 
treatment period as a percentage of their lives will be less than for younger children. Since 
take-up of the grant has increased each year (Case et al., 2003), one would expect a number 
of older children for whom application for the CSG was only made recently, resulting in the 
extent of their treatment being relatively low. 
As for the various outcomes, the HAZ and WHZ variables were created using, as a reference, 
the 2000 US CDC Growth Chart (which is premised on the anthropometric measures of a 
sample of well-nourished US children). This reference is chosen as a standard against which 
children in both the treated and control samples can be measured so as to normalise the z-
scores (Duflo, 2003: 6). 
The differences in outcome variables between the three groups receiving the CSG in a low, 
medium or high dosage provide tentative corroborating evidence that the presence of the 
CSG does have a positive impact on the lives of the children receiving it and that this impact  
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increases with the duration of grant receipt. For most of the outcome variables, there are 
definite  improvements  when  the  dosage  is  increased  from  low  to  medium.  The  only  two 
exceptions  are  for  school  enrolment,  where  no  significant  change  is  observed,  and 
expenditure  on  adult  goods,  where  an  increase  in  spending  is  observed  as  the  dosage 
increases. 
As  for  the  change  from  medium  to  high,  further  improvements  (albeit  insignificant)  are 
observed  for  all  of  the  outcome  variables  except  WHZ,  food  expenditure  and  school 
enrolment. The change in school enrolment does not warrant any further investigation, given 
the fact that the change from medium to high is merely 1 percentage point (from 99% to 
98%). 
However, the decrease in WHZ and food expenditure deserves further mention, as these 
might  be  as  a  result  of  the  way  in  which  the  treatment  variable  is  measured.  Given  the 
difference in the mean ages of the children receiving a medium versus high dosage of the 
CSG, it is possible that the decrease in WHZ and food expenditure is an indication of possible 
thresholds effects of the CSG. In other words improvements of these outcome variables might 
only be observable once the CSG has been received for a number of years (which, given the 
average age of the children in the high treatment group, has not been the case for most 
children in that group). 
In line with the approach taken by Agüero et al. (2009), Table 2 also contains a variable 
labelled caregiver motivation, which was created to take into account unobserved differences 
between caregivers which could cause certain caregivers to apply for the CSG earlier than 
others. The creation of this variable is discussed in the section below. 
6.  Delay in Application and Caregiver Motivation (Eagerness) 
The  descriptive  statistics  in  the  previous  section  set  out  observable  characteristics  which 
potentially would have an effect on the extent of treatment, in other words how long the child’s 
caregiver  delayed  before  applying  for  and  receiving  the  CSG.  These  include  caregiver, 
household and child-specific characteristics.   
Agüero et al. (2009) rightly point out that there is, however, another underlying force affecting 
the  extent  of  treatment,  which  includes  unobserved  factors  influencing  the  motivation  or 
eagerness of each caregiver to take up the grant. These unobserved factors, if not controlled 
for, could potentially bias the estimation of the treatment effect. 
Some initial evidence of the differences in caregiver motivation is found in the number of days 
which caregivers delayed before applying for the child support grant. While the application 
delay for children receiving only a low dosage is more than three years, children in the high 
dosage group have an application delay of less than two years. Using the date on which the 
NIDS  interview  was  conducted  (instead  of  the  application  date)  as  the  cut-off  date,  the  
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“application delay” for untreated eligible children is almost 6 years, illustrating the differences 
in tardiness between the caregivers in the different groups. 
As  set  out  in  Agüero  et  al.  (2009),  this  unobserved  motivation  is  a  function  of  the 
effectiveness  of  the  CSG  roll-out  in  the  area  where  the  caregiver  lives.  Although  the 
programme was rolled out simultaneously in all areas, the data reveal that the delay in take-
up for older children (who were already born at the introduction of the CSG) is much shorter 
for urban areas (an average of 886 days) compared to rural areas (an average of 919 days).   
In addition, the delay for younger children is also much less than for children who have only 
recently become eligible,
16with a delay of more than three years being recorded for children 
who were already born at the time of the introduction of the CSG versus less than a year 
(approximately 10 months) for children born in 2008 (i.e. the year of the NIDS survey). This 
confirms previous evidence that the initial roll-out of the CSG was not as effective as in later 
years (Agüero et al., 2009). 
Following  the  approach  in  Agüero  et  al.  (2009),  a  variable  capturing  these  differences  in 
caregiver motivation was created. In the first place, the expected delay was estimated as a 
function of the child’s age and whether the child lived in a rural or urban area. This was done 
using  OLS,  and  data  of  children  born  two  years  or  more  prior  to  the  NIDS  survey.  This 
approach is in line with Agüero et al. (2009: 13) and evidence by Case et al. (2005) that the 
average delay for take-up of the CSG stabilised after two years from birth (in other words the 
average delay of children under two years will be underestimated, as there are many children 
in this age cohort who have not yet taken up the CSG).
17These younger children are therefore 
excluded in the estimation of the expected delay. 
Thereafter, the difference between actual delay and the expected delay was calculated and 
then standardised, as a measure of the motivation with which a specific caregiver took up the 
CSG, compared to other caregivers of the same age and location cohort.
18 
Table  2  sets  out  the  positive  relationship  between  caregiver  motivation  and  the  extent of 
treatment  (increasing  from  0.24  standard  deviations  below  the  average  to  almost  half  a 
standard  deviation  above).  It  is  also  clear  that  treated  children  have  more  motivated 
caregivers  (0.12  standard  deviations  above  the  average)  than  untreated  children  (0.42 
standard deviations below the average). 
                                                 
16 It should be noted that only children born two years or more prior to the NIDS survey were taken into 
account in this calculation, as the average delay of children born close to the survey date is most likely 
under-estimated (see Agüero et al., 2009: 13). 
17 Of the sample of children under the age of two years, there are approximately 40% who are eligible for 
the CSG but are not yet receiving the grant. In contrast, the corresponding figure for children older than two 
years is 22%. 
18 For children already born at the time of introduction of the CSG, the delay was calculated from the date 
of introduction of the CSG. For children who were eligible but had not yet taken up the CSG at the time of 
the NIDS survey, the delay was calculated up to the day of the survey interview with the particular child.  
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7.  Description of the Samples used 
To incorporate the various outcome variables (and estimate the average treatment effect 
based on samples for which evaluation of the effect of the CSG on the specific outcome 
variable would make sense), three sub-samples are specified. 
More specifically, the first sample is used to analyse the effect of the CSG on HAZ and WHZ.  
This includes the full sample of all children eligible for receiving the CSG, i.e. all children 
aged younger than 14 years and whose caregiver’s income is below the threshold specified 
by the means test. There are 4914 children in this full sample, of which 3550 receive the 
CSG while 1303 do not. In the baseline estimation using OLS and binary PSM, both treated 
and untreated eligible children are included in the sample. However, for the purpose of the 
continuous treatment estimator, the sample is limited to eligible children younger than 14 
years who are receiving the CSG. 
The second sample is used for the expenditure outcome variables. Since the expenditure 
variables are evaluated at the household level, all eligible children who are not in receipt of 
the CSG, although living in a household where another child receives the CSG, are dropped 
from the sample. This essentially limits the analysis to a household level (i.e. children who 
are in a household where they are the CSG recipients and children who are in households 
where no-one is receiving the CSG). This is done to avoid including eligible children who are 
in a household where they are not a recipient of the CSG, but another child in the household 
is (if one assumes a pooling of resources in the household, income from the CSG would be 
spent  both  on  recipient  and  non-beneficiary  children  within  that  household).  It  should  be 
noted that, although this has a substantial effect in limiting the sample for the first (baseline) 
technique, it does not limit the sample where treatment is treated as a continuous variable. 
The third sample limits the original data by excluding all eligible children under the age of 5 
years. This is done to obtain the effect on schooling for children who are of school-going age. 
8.  Baseline Estimates using OLS and Binary Propensity Score Matching 
As a baseline, the treatment effect was estimated using OLS. The results of these estimates 
are set out in Table 3. For the sake of comparability, the covariates used in the regressions 
are the same as those used in the estimation of the average treatment effect.   
The coefficients from the OLS regressions are as expected, apart from the coefficient on 
caregiver motivation, which is significantly negative in the regression for food expenditure.  
The negative sign of this coefficient could be explained by the fact that food expenditure 
decreases slightly in the sample for the highest level of caregiver motivation. The results 
from the OLS regressions do not provide any evidence of a significant treatment effect for 
any of the outcome variables, apart from expenditure on adult goods, which is negative and  
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significant  at  the  10%  level,  indicating  a  decrease  in  expenditure  on  adult  goods  for 
households that are receiving the CSG versus those that are not. 
 
Table 3: OLS estimation of treatment effect 
   Sample 1  Sample 2  Sample 3 








Child receives CSG 
-0.08  -0.26  44.25  -8.91*  0.00  -0.02 
Caregiver 
Characteristics 
                 
Motivation 
-0.02  0.19***  -20.06*  0.92  0.00  -0.01 
Employed 
-0.09  -0.06  20.83  -7.24*  -0.01  -0.05 
Married 
0.12  -0.27  -0.18  14.13***  0.00  -0.09***   
Child 
Characteristics                   
Age 
-0.07  -0.98***  -23.39*  0.5  0.03**  0.17***   
Age squared 
0  0.08***  1.48  -0.04  -0.00**  -0.01***   
Boy 
-0.15**  -0.08  -53.49**  -1.11  -0.00*  0.16***  
Household 
Characteristics                   
Electricity 
-0.15*  -0.25  88.20***  0.56  0.00  -0.01 
Piped water 
-0.09  -0.24  117.86***  2.47  0.00  0.00 
Landline 
0.09  0.01  269.86***  3.84  0.00  0.03 
Flush toilet 
0.30***  0.12  45.81  14.75***  -0.01**  -0.08**    
Female head 
0  0.09  -77.62***  2.98  0.00  -0.05**    
Log pc expenditure 
0.08  0.03  -  -  0.00  -0.01 
Constant 
-0.07  3.08**  694.54***  14.79**  0.87***  -0.58***   
Observations 
1872  456  3530  680  2033  2054 
*Significant at 10% level. 
**Significant at 5% level. 
***Significant at 1% level. 
 
The baseline estimates are, however, not an accurate estimate of the treatment effect since 
the treated and control units may differ substantially, giving rise to potential selection bias.  
More  specifically,  treatment  evaluation  requires  the  estimation  of  the  average  treatment 
effect, written as 
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treatment effect potentially is confounded in a situation where this bias term is not equal to 
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One proposed solution to reducing the bias is PSM, i.e. the conditional probability measure 
of participation in treatment, given the underlying characteristics contained in 
Trivedi, 2005: 864). Under certain conditions, PSM provides a way in which to control for 
selection bias. These conditions ensure that, after conditioning on the propensity scores of 
individuals  (i.e.  the  propensity  of  being  selected  into  treatment  of  both  the  treat
untreated), none of the selection bias remains.
PSM was applied to all three samples, for all six outcome variables. However, no significant 
treatment effect was estimated. One exception is the adult expenditure variable, for which a 
significant  (and  fairly  robust)  treatment  effect  was  estimated.  However,  this  result  is  not 
convincing, as the overlap in the propensity score between treated and untreated units is 
very small. A more detailed discussion of the implementation of and results from PSM is 
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above,  one  of  the  underlying  assumptions  of  PSM  is  the  existence  of a  binary  treatment 
variable. More specifically, it assumes that all individuals may be classified as falling into one 
those who received treatment and those who received no treatment at all.  
Implicit  in  this  there  is  an  assumption  that  those  that  were  treated  are  comparable  and 
received equal dosages of treatment. However, as discussed in Agüero et al. (2009), this 
assumption clearly does not hold in the case of the CSG. There are large discrepancies in the 
length of exposure to the CSG, depending on the rollout and expansion schedule of the grant  
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as  well  as  individual  characteristics  relating  to  motivation  and  the  take  up  of  the  grant.  
Conventional  applications  of  PSM  fail  to  take  this  variation  into  account  and  it  has  been 
argued that this may partly explain inconclusive results regarding the treatment effect of CSG 
(Agüero et al., 2009). It may thus in this instance be more appropriate to think of treatment as 
a continuous variable.   
Hirano and Imbens (2004) were the first to extend the use of propensity scores to develop a 
continuous  treatment  estimator.  They  use  data  collected  from  winners  of  the  Megabucks 
lottery in Massachusetts during the mid-1980s to estimate the average labour response of 
winners, more specifically their earnings six years after winning. The data were generated as 
a random process, and should, accordingly, satisfy the general unconfoundedness condition.  
However,  there  were  significant  non-responses  to  the  survey  which  may  have  introduced 
bias, necessitating the use of a technique which reduces bias and provides more credible 
estimates than those obtained using simple regressions (Hirano and Imbens, 2004: 73).  
Hirano  and  Imbens (2004)  show  how,  following the  PSM  literature  discussed  earlier,  it  is 
possible to remove the bias relating to treatment status by introducing an unconfoundedness 
assumption  similar  to  the  one  set  out  above.  They  obtain  a  generalised  version  of  the 
propensity  score  in  the  binary  treatment  case  (henceforth  referred  to  as  the  “generalised 
propensity score” (GPS)), producing unbiased estimates of the effect of treatment. This paper 
now provides a brief overview of the theoretical basis on which the technique is founded 
before applying it to the NIDS data. 
9.1. Theoretical Framework and Underlying Assumptions 
To formalise the above, suppose the analysis draws from a random sample of   units 
indexed            .  For each unit, the set of potential outcomes is given by the random 
variable        ,  called  the  “unit-level  dose-response  function”  by  Hirano  and  Imbens 
(2004: 74). In other words,         is the potential response of unit   to receiving a dosage 
of treatment  , where         . For current purposes, the dosage     is the percentage of 
each child’s life during which he/she has received the CSG as at the time of the survey, 
and  the  set  of  outcomes          include  all  relevant  health,  nutritional  and  educational 
benefits accruing as a result of the grant. 
In the binary treatment case discussed above,           ..  However, where treatment is 
a continuous variable, as is the case with receipt of the CSG,            , with    and    
representing the upper and lower bounds of the treatment interval, set at 0%-100% for 
current purposes.    
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It is assumed that, for each of the units within the sample, it is possible to observe the 
vector of covariates   ; the level of treatment,    ; and the outcome corresponding to the 
treatment received               9. 
The object of interest is referred to by Hirano and Imbens (2004) as the “average dose-
response function”,                 . Following the authors, the subscript     is dropped 
until the next section to simplify notation. 
The  fundamental  assumption  of  Hirano  and  Imbens  (2004)  extends  the  weak 
unconfoundedness  assumption  of  Rosenbaum  and  Rubin  (1983)  to  continuous 
treatments, and states that 
                      
Put differently, outcome and treatment should be independent once the covariates have 
been controlled for. This general weak unconfoundedness assumption must merely hold 
for each level of treatment, and is not required to hold jointly for all potential outcomes 
(Hirano & Imbens, 2004: 74). 
In the current context, this assumption requires that, conditional on the covariates, there 
are no additional factors which influence both take-up of the CSG (extent of treatment) 
and  the  outcome  variables.  Controlling for  a  variety  of  household  and  individual-level 
characteristics, as well as caregiver motivation, it is argued that extent of treatment and 
health and educational outcomes are unconfounded, unless, as Agüero et al. (2009: 20) 
note, more dedicated caregivers postponed having children until after the introduction of 
the  CSG.  However,  since  the  CSG  effectively  became  available  immediately  upon 
announcement to all eligible children, this is an unlikely scenario.  
Next, the GPS is defined by Hirano and Imbens (2004:74). If        is the conditional 
density of the treatment, given the covariates, as in 
                     
then the GPS is defined as            
In addition, just as in the binary case, the GPS has a balancing property in that, within 
strata of the same value of       , the extent of treatment is not dependent on the value 
of the covariates (Hirano & Imbens, 2004: 74).  This can be stated as 
                    
                                                 
19 It is also necessary to make assumptions regarding the probability space of these variables, which are 
listed in Hirano and Imbens (2004:2) and Bia and Mattei (2008: 355).  
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If  both  the  balancing  property  as  well  as  the  general  weak  unconfoundedness 
assumption holds, Hirnao and Imbens (2004: 75) show that assignment to treatment is 
unconfounded, conditional on the GPS.  Then, for each level of treatment  ,  
                                    
It is important to note that the conditional density of treatment, given the covariates, is 
evaluated at each level of treatment. Accordingly, there are as many propensity scores 
as there are levels of treatment (Hirano & Imbens, 2004: 75). 
Last, Hirano and Imbens (2004: 76) illustrate how the GPS can be used to produce an 
unbiased estimate of the dose-response function at each level of treatment. First, the 
conditional expectation of the outcome variable, given the treatment level     and the 
estimated GPS,   (both scalar variables) is estimated, as in                             
(Hirano & Imbens, 2004: 76). Then, this conditional expectation is averaged over the 
GPS at the relevant level of treatment                                 . It is emphasised 
that the average is not taken over the entire GPS  , but rather over the GPS at the 
specific treatment level, i.e.       (Hirano & Imbens, 2004: 76). 
9.2. Estimation of the Treatment Effect and Inference 
To facilitate the practical implementation of the above, the paper follows a three-step 
approach  in  line  with  Hirano  and  Imbens’  (2004)  original  methodology,  as  well  as 
subsequent work by Bia and Mattei (2008) and Agüero et al. (2009).   
As a first step, the conditional distribution of treatment given the covariates is modelled, 
assuming a normal distribution, as in 
               
′        
where   ,    and    are estimated using maximum likelihood, and the GPS as 
                                              
                      
As  part  of  this  step,  Bia  and  Mattei  (2008:  358)  also  suggest  testing  whether  the 
balancing  property  holds  by  dividing  the  sample  into  strata  and  calculating the  mean 
difference of each covariate between units in different strata, conditional on the GPS.   
The second step involves the estimation of the function       . This estimation can be 
done using flexible polynomial functions; Bia and  Mattei (2008: 358) suggest using a 
quadratic approximation with an interaction between the treatment level and the GPS, as 
in 
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These coefficients may be estimated using ordinary least squares or maximum likelihood 
(depending on the type of outcome variable). Hirano and Imbens (2004: 76) emphasise 
that the estimated coefficients do not have any causal interpretation. 
Finally,  the  parameters  estimated  in  the  previous  step  are  used  to  derive  the  dose-
response at a particular treatment level, by computing the average potential outcome at 
treatment level     
           
 
 
                        
                                    
 
   
 
To  derive  the  entire  dose-response  function,  this  estimation  is  repeated  for  each 
treatment level of interest (Hirano & Imbens, 2004: 77). 
Following Bia and Mattei (2008: 364), this can be taken a step further. After deriving the 
dose-response functions at each level of treatment, the treatment-effect function can also 
be  estimated.  This  is  done  by  comparing  the  dose-response  at  a  specific  level  of 
treatment (or dosage,  ) with the outcome at a lower reference level(     ), where   
represents a treatment gap of size     
                                                   
In the current paper, the treatment effect of interest is the improvement of child health, 
nutrition and education at each level of receipt of the CSG (  ), compared with children 
who have received the CSG for a smaller percentage of their lives (     ). The results 
from applying this technique to the NIDS data are set out below. 
10. Results 
The analysis of the outcome variables is done using the same three sub-samples of the data 
used in the application of the PSM in the previous section. The results in this section follow 
the three-step approach described above.   
10.1. Modelling the Conditional Distribution of Treatment 
As a first step, a maximum likelihood estimation was conducted for all three samples.  
The model is specified to contain covariates which influence both take-up of the CSG 
and the outcome variables, in line with the literature (Caliendo & Kopeinig, 2008: 38).  
In addition, it must be specified such that the conditional independence assumption 
listed  above  is  satisfied.  Here  the  model  is  specified  which  controls  for  observable 
caregiver characteristics as well as observable child characteristics that may influence 
child well-being as well as take-up of the grant. The model also includes a range of 
covariates which are most likely to influence both take-up and the outcome variables, 
including access to basic amenities (such as piped water, flush toilets, electricity and a  
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landline telephone) and controls for household poverty by including log of monthly per 
capita expenditure and a binary variable for female-headed households (which are on 
average worse off than male-headed households)
20.  
One  of  the  assumptions  to  satisfy  when  implementing  the  GPS  technique  is  that, 
conditional  on  the  covariates  specified  in  the  model,  extent  of  treatment  and  the 
outcome  variable  are  conditionally  mean  independent. This  condition  is  satisfied  by 
controlling for  a  range of  child-,  household-  and  caregiver-specific  covariates  which 
together predict take-up of the CSG as well as the extent of treatment. However, in 
addition  to  these  covariates,  as  indicated  by  Agüero  et  al.  (2009),  the  caregiver-
motivation  variable  is  also  added  to  the  model  in  order  to  control  for  unobserved 
caregiver  characteristics.  Since  the  use  of  the  generalised  propensity  score  per 
implication  only  includes  treated  units,  the  three  samples  discussed  previously  are 
limited to only included children who have been receiving the CSG for some period of 
their lives. 
The  results  from  the  maximum  likelihood  estimation  are  set  out  in  Table  4.  As 
expected, the coefficient of the caregiver-motivation variable is large and significant, 
indicating the expected positive relationship between more motivated caregivers and 
larger dosages of treatment. In addition, the fact that a child’s caregiver is employed 
has a significant effect on the length of the child’s treatment in the first two samples.
21 
The child-age variables are jointly significant
22 and confirm previous evidence that older 
children are more likely to be receiving the CSG for a smaller percentage of their lives, 
possibly as a result of the fact that the roll-out of the grant became more effective with 
time. As for household characteristics, having a landline decreases the probability of 
the child having received the CSG for a large portion of his/her life. Having electricity in 
the  household  has  the  opposite  effect,  which  is  correlated  with  the  fact  that  more 
households in urban areas have access to electricity and were therefore first to know of 
and apply for the CSG. 
                                                 
20  The  data  reveal  that  the  mean  monthly  per  capita  expenditure  of  female-headed  households  is 
approximately R700, while that for male-headed households is approximately R1300. 
21  The  similarities  in  the  results  of  these  two  samples  are  to  be  expected,  since  the  same  sample  is 
essentially used (as discussed above). 
22 At the 1% significance level for the first two samples, not for the third.  
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Table 4: Maximum likelihood estimates with different samples 
   Sample 1  Sample 2  Sample 3 
Variable  Coefficient  Robust 
Standard 
Error 
Coefficient  Robust 
Standard 
Error 





           
Motivation  10.01***  0.49  10.01***  0.49  7.26***  0.55 
Employed  2.51*  1.50  2.46*  1.48  1.83  1.86 
Married  1.36  1.20  1.35  1.20  1.25  1.57 
Child 
Characteristics             
Age  5.14***  0.49  5.14***  0.49  -1.43  1.97 
Age squared  -0.52***  0.04  -0.52***  0.04  -0.16  0.11 
Boy  0.12  1.02  0.12  1.02  0.11  1.37 
Household 
Characteristics             
Electricity  4.24***  1.25  4.20***  1.24  4.88***  1.67 
Piped water  -3.48**  1.35  -3.51***  1.34  -2.92  1.80 
Landline  -0.87  1.99  -0.91  1.99  -1.94  2.57 
Flush toilet  0.52  1.43  0.49  1.42  -0.46  1.91 
Female head  -0.87  1.10  -0.87  1.10  -0.84  1.50 
Log pc expenditure  -0.18  0.76  -  -  -0.60  0.99 
Constant  49.90***  4.36  48.97***  1.79  80.05***  10.16 
Observations  2375  2375  1391 
*Significant at 10% level. 
**Significant at 5% level. 
***Significant at 1% level.  
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As a next step, the balancing property for all three samples is explored in Table 5. The 
first part of the table deals with the data before adjusting for the propensity score. To 
test whether the mean of each of the covariates within one of the treatment terciles is 
different from the combined mean of the other two groups, the t-statistic is used. 
The  second  part  of  the  table  deals  with  the  balancing  property  of  the  data  after 
adjusting for the GPS, following the algorithm suggested by Hirano and Imbens (2004).  
In  the  first  place,  for  each  of  the  three  treatment  terciles,  the  probability  that  each 
observation within the tercile would have received the median dosage of treatment is 
estimated. More specifically, if the median treatment level in the first terciles is given by 
  
   , then in each tercile,     
        is estimated.   
Next,  all  observations  are  pooled  again  and  then  divided  into  five  blocks  or  strata 
based on the estimation of     
       . Within each of these five blocks, the differences 
between the mean covariates of those observations falling within the lowest treatment 
tercile and those which do not, are calculated and tested for statistical significance.  
This process is then repeated for the medium- and high-treatment terciles.   
From  the  table  it  can  be  seen  that  the  balancing  property  is  not  satisfied  for  the 
unadjusted data. The GPS improves the balancing of the data, reducing the highest t-
statistics  (especially  for  the  age  and  caregiver  motivation)  to  make  the  data  more 
balanced. However, it should be pointed out that, even after conditioning on the GPS, 
the  child-age  and  caregiver-motivation  covariates  remain  unbalanced  between  the 
treatment terciles. In the case of the caregiver-motivation covariates, this imbalance is 
a result of the way in which the variable was generated (i.e. to capture the differences 
in caregiver motivation between caregivers in these three terciles). In the case of the 
child-age  covariates,  the  imbalance  again  indicates  the  differences  in  the  ages  of 
children in different treatment terciles as a result of the slow initial roll-out of the CSG. 
It is argued that it is for this reason that the age variables should be included in the 
model when estimating the GPS (as set out in Table 4), since it is important when 
estimating the GPS and the average treatment effect to also control for the age-group 
in  which  the  child  falls  (so  as  to  ensure  that  the  effect  on  the  outcome  variable  is 
measured for children of the same age group, who have been exposed to the same 
length of treatment).  
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Table 5: The balancing property: t-statistics for equality of means between treatment terciles 
    Sample 1  Sample 2  Sample 3 
  Unadjusted for GPS  Adjusted for GPS  Adjusted for GPS  Adjusted for GPS 
  Treatment Intervals  Treatment Intervals  Treatment Intervals  Treatment Intervals 
Variable  Low  Medium  High  Low  Medium  High  Low  Medium  High  Low  Medium  High 
  [0,34)  [34,67)  [67,100]  [0,34)  [34,67)  [67,100]  [0,34)  [34,67)  [67,100]  [0,34)  [34,67)  [67,100] 
Caregiver 
Characteristics                         
Motivation  11.64  6.21  -16.93  6.39  2.88  -4.19  6.41  2.79  -4.07  4.66  1.76  -1.51 
Employed  0.75  0.53  -1.17  -0.81  -0.22  1.99  -0.81  -0.24  1.94  -0.20  0.89  -0.67 
Married  0.68  -0.15  -0.48  -0.34  -1.14  0.94  -0.34  -1.13  0.99  0.64  0.16  0.28 
Child 
Characteristics                         
Age  -7.06  -3.40  9.64  -0.23  -9.61  5.17  -0.37  -9.74  5.36  1.78  -7.42  4.92 
Age squared  -9.83  -4.95  13.80  0.57  -11.41  6.08  0.42  -11.56  6.27  1.50  -7.61  5.81 
Boy  0.60  0.15  -0.68  -0.57  0.09  -0.64  -0.49  0.10  -0.50  0.29  -1.13  0.64 
Household 
Characteristics                         
Electricity  2.43  -1.00  -1.31  -0.68  -1.52  3.02  -0.69  -1.46  2.97  0.97  -1.26  0.41 
Piped water  -0.85  0.24  0.56  0.26  0.63  -1.42  0.16  0.68  -1.37  0.25  -0.66  -0.26 
Landline  -0.89  0.50  0.35  0.13  1.13  -0.96  0.09  1.11  -0.94  -0.07  0.24  -0.69 
Flush toilet  -0.24  1.19  -0.87  -1.04  1.16  -0.20  -1.06  1.23  -0.05  -0.25  0.16  0.14 
Female head  -1.22  0.15  0.98  -0.02  0.04  -0.58  -0.04  0.07  -0.50  -0.42  -0.29  -0.43 
Log pc 
expenditure  0.38  -1.27  0.81  0.68  -1.16  0.62  -  -  -  0.62  -0.67  -0.41 
  
 
10.2.  Estimating the Outcomes Conditioned on the GPS and Treatment
The  results  of  the  estimates  in  the  second  stage  are  presented  in  Table  6.  For  the 
continuous-outcome variables, ordinary least squares estimation was used on a linear 
model, while a logit model was specified for the binary school outcome variables.
As  indicated  above,  the  coefficients  from  these  estimations  have  no  direct  meaning, 
however, if the coefficients in this estimation are statistically different to zero this can be 
interpreted as evidence that they introduce no bias (Bia & Mattei, 2008: 359). 
The results of this test are reported at the bottom of Table 6. The null
rejected  for  three  of  the  models,  i.e.  HAZ,  progress  through  the  school  system  and 
expenditure of adult goods. The analysis of the remaining three outcome variables is 
therefore taken to the next stage in order to estimate the treatment effect.
 
Table 6: Second stage estimates per outcome
  Sample 1 


















Observations  1695  980
Prob>F  0.01  0.10
Prob>Chi2   
 
10.3.  Estimating the Average Treatment Effect
The average treatment effect can now be estimated as the difference between the dose
response functions at different levels of treatment. As described above, the treatment 
effect is estimated as the difference between the outcome at a specific treatment level 
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The  results  of  the  estimates  in  the  second  stage  are  presented  in  Table  6.  For  the 
outcome variables, ordinary least squares estimation was used on a linear 
while a logit model was specified for the binary school outcome variables.
As  indicated  above,  the  coefficients  from  these  estimations  have  no  direct  meaning, 
however, if the coefficients in this estimation are statistically different to zero this can be 
nterpreted as evidence that they introduce no bias (Bia & Mattei, 2008: 359). 
The results of this test are reported at the bottom of Table 6. The null
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: Second stage estimates per outcome 
  Sample 2 







(Robust Standard Error) 
0.37  131.45  28.34  4.15
(0.21)  (9.01)  (9.50)  (1.27)
0.00  0.67  -1.19  0.05
(0.01)  (0.39)  (0.41)  (0.05)
0.00  -0.01  0.01  0.00
(0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)
113.11  -64.06  3280.65  60.00
(50.89)  (1179.49)  (1303.19)  (170.24)
1.74  -7.21  -42.77  -
(0.71)  (20.82)  (22.05)  (2.85)
980  2375  490  1265
0.10  0.23  0.01 
      0.37
Estimating the Average Treatment Effect 
The average treatment effect can now be estimated as the difference between the dose
functions at different levels of treatment. As described above, the treatment 
effect is estimated as the difference between the outcome at a specific treatment level 
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4.15  -2.08 
(1.27)  (0.32) 
0.05  0.03 
(0.05)  (0.01) 
0.00  0.00 
(0.00)  (0.00) 
60.00  122.70 
(170.24)  (35.66) 
-2.83  -2.95 
(2.85)  (0.68) 
1265  1175 
   
0.37  0.00 
The average treatment effect can now be estimated as the difference between the dose-
functions at different levels of treatment. As described above, the treatment 
effect is estimated as the difference between the outcome at a specific treatment level  
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compared  to the  outcome  of  a  lower  reference  level  (       ),  where     represents a 
treatment gap of size    . For the current analysis, the value of     is set to 10, i.e. the 
difference is calibrated to 10%.  The result are presented as Figures 2 and 3, with the 
treatment level indicated on the y-axis and the change in the outcome variable at each 
level of treatment is indicated on the x-axis. 
The 95% confidence intervals (calculated using bootstrapped standard errors with 1000 
repetitions) are also included for each of the outcome variables in order to provide a 
sense of the significance of the estimated treatment effect. The specific region for which 
a significant effect was estimated, is marked with vertical lines on each figure. 
Since no significant treatment effect was estimated for the adult expenditure outcome 
variable (based on the confidence intervals calculated), this figure is not included. 
Figure 2 reflects positive gains from the CSG on HAZ. The estimated average treatment 
effect is, however, not very large. Positive and statistically significant gains in HAZ from 
receiving the CSG are recorded for children receiving the grant for 40-60% of their lives.  
The gains in HAZ reach a maximum where children have been receiving the CSG for 
50%  of their  lives,  compared  to  a  children  who  have  only  been  receiving  it for  40%, 
where  the  increase  in  the  z-score  is  approximately  0.06,  translating  into  6%  of  the 
standard deviation. This estimated gain in HAZ occurs at a lower level of treatment and is 
somewhat less than the effect estimated in the previous study by Agüero et al. (2009), 
where an increase of 0.2 in the z-score for HAZ was estimated. 
The treatment effect of the CSG on HAZ is estimated to be negative at higher dosages of 
treatment.  However,  this  portion  of  the  curve  may  be  ignored  since  the  confidence 
interval band lies on both sides of zero, indicating that there is no statistically significant 
evidence of any effect for such high treatment dosages. 
Looking  at  Figure  3,  there  appears  to  be  some  positive  impact  on  the  probability  of 
repeating a school year. A significant decrease in this probability is estimated for children 
receiving  the  CSG  between  30%  and  60%  of  their  lives.  The  maximum  impact  is  a 
decrease  in  the  probability  of  approximately  0.04  percentage  points  for  receiving  the 
CSG between 40% and 50% of the child’s life. Again, the portions where a positive effect 
on the probability of repeating a school year is estimated can be ignored, as these fall 
outside the confidence interval. 
Although these estimates suggest that the CSG does have some positive impact on the 
lives  of  beneficiary  children,  these  effects  are  small  and  do  not  provide  conclusive 
evidence that the transfers received by caregivers are spent mainly on improving the 
well-being  of  children.  This  might  be  explained  by  the  fact  that  the  transfers  are 
unconditional and may accordingly be channelled towards the purchase of other goods   
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Figure 3: Estimated change in probability of repeating a school year (chi
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which are not only to the benefit of children. In addition, given the fact that the grant 
amount is relatively small (compared to, for example, the OAP), it might also be that 
when the cash is spread across the entire household the observable effect on children is 
small. 
Nevertheless, the results set out above do provide some evidence of a positive impact of 
the CSG and seems to indicate that some of the cash from the grant does, at least, filter 
through to beneficiary children in the form of better health and nutrition, as well as faster 
progression through the school system. 
11. Conclusion 
This paper set out to evaluate the impact of the CSG on child health, nutrition and education 
following the approach by Agüero et al. (2009) in order to ascertain if the cash transferred has 
any effect on the well-being of beneficiary children. The evaluation is of particular importance 
as the CSG is currently administered as an unconditional cash transfer programme. 
Since the CSG was made available to all eligible children at introduction of the grant and not 
implemented in a randomised fashion, a simple estimation of the effect of treatment between 
individuals receiving the grants and those who remain untreated is subject to selection bias. 
Accordingly,  this  paper  employs  two  techniques  using  propensity  scores  to  estimate  the 
average treatment effect of the CSG on children and households. Under the assumptions set 
out in the paper, these techniques can provide unbiased estimates of the treatment effect of 
the CSG. 
Applying PSM to the NIDS data, the paper finds no convincing evidence of improvements in 
child  health,  nutrition  or  education.  These  results  may  be  driven  by  the  fact  that  PSM 
assumes a binary treatment variable, which is not the case with the CSG.   
Applying a second technique using a generalised form of the propensity scores, results in 
positive treatment effects for children’s HAZ and whether the child has repeated a school 
year. The treatment effect estimated for HAZ is in line with, although slightly less than, a 
previous  estimation  by  Agüero  et  al.  (2009).  Although  these  estimates  do  provide  some 
evidence of the positive effect of the CSG on the lives of children, the estimates are small and 
do not provide clear evidence that the transfers received by caregivers are spent mainly on 
improving the well-being of children. Some potential and plausible explanations of this have 
been offered.  
Nevertheless, the findings in this paper seem to suggest that some of the cash transferred 
through the CSG appears to be spent on improving the well-being of children and in this 
sense  contributes  to  previous  findings  in  the  literature  indicating  a  positive  impact  on  the 
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Appendix A – Algorithm used to identify children eligible for the CSG in NIDS 
Receipt of the CSG was captured by two sets of questions in the NIDS survey.  The first set of 
questions  required  respondents  to  indicate  whether  “the  household  receives  a  social  grant”, 
followed (if the first question was answered in the affirmative) by a question asking respondents 
to indicate “what type of grant”.  In addition, a question was included later in the survey asking 
respondents to indicate whether “a child support grant was received on behalf of the child”.  In 
constructing a binary variable indicating receipt of the CSG, a positive answer for either of the two 
sets of questions was taken as an indication that the CSG was indeed received for that specific 
child. 
As for the algorithm applied in identifying eligible children, all children under the age of 14 were 
taken as being age-eligible.  In addition, monthly income data for all adults were generated from 
the  imputed  income  variables  included  in  the  data  set,  and  included  all  regular  as  well  as 
temporary income apart from grant income and UIF payments (which is in accordance with the 
government regulations regarding the CSG) (Budlender et al, 2005: 13).   
Caregivers were matched to specific children using the question included in the child data set 
requesting children to indicate the person code of their primary caregiver (if the caregiver resided 
in the household).  In addition, married caregivers were identified and matched to their spouses.  
Monthly income data for married caregivers were calculated as using income for both adults (i.e. 
caregiver and spouse). 
Since data on income (even after imputations) were missing for many caregivers, all cases where 
caregivers indicated that both they and their spouses were unemployed and where income data 
were missing were automatically coded as being eligible for the CSG. 
Lastly, all children living in rural areas as well as in informal dwellings in urban areas were coded 
as falling into the rural classification specified by the means test (again, this is in accordance with 
the relevant government regulation) (Budlender et al, 2005: 9). 
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Appendix B – Baseline Estimates of OLS and Binary Propensity Score Matching 
1.  The Evaluation Problem 
PSM will only reduce the bias in the OLS estimates if certain conditions hold.  In the first 
place, a meaningful estimation of the treatment effect can only be made if there is a region 
where  the  propensity  scores  of  the  treated  and  control  units  overlap  (Ravallion,  2007: 
3797).  This has been referred to in the literature as the “region of common support”.  It has 
been shown that the results from PSM can be severely biased if sufficient overlap between 
the  propensity  scores  of  the  treated  and  untreated  units  does  not  exist,  (Caliendo  & 
Kopeinig, 2008: 45).   
In addition, following Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983: 42), there are two qualifying conditions 
for the use of PSM, which are listed below (notational adjustments have been made for the 
sake of consistency). 
1.1. Balance 
As a first condition, it is held that the propensity score must be such that the conditional 
distribution of the covariates in  , given the propensity score      , must be the same for 
treated           and  control           units.    In  other  words,  for  units  with  the  same 
propensity score, selection into treatment is random, and these units should be identical in 
terms of the observable characteristics in    (Cameron & Trivedi, 2005: 865).  This is a 
testable hypothesis (as will be illustrated below), and can be stated as  
              
1.2. Ignorability 
The  second  condition,  referred  to  by  Rosenbaum  and  Rubin  (1983:  42)  as  “strongly 
ignorable  treatment  assignment”  is  also  referred  to  as  the  conditional  independence 
assumption.  Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983: 44) show that the conditional independence 
condition also holds with the use of propensity scores, as in  
                                  
Therefore, conditional on the propensity score, the outcome variable is independent of 
treatment.  This second condition takes into account the fact that selection into treatment 
is often confounded where data are not obtained from non-experimental sources.  In other 
words,  the  same  factors  influencing  selection  into  treatment  could  also  potentially 
influence  the  outcome  variable.    This  is,  of  course,  not  a  testable  assumption,  which 
emphasises the importance of the choice of covariates.    
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2.  Matching Algorithms 
Once a set of potential control units have been identified (based on the propensity score) for 
each  treated  unit,  this  set  is  weighted  and  matched  to  gauge  the  average  difference  in 
outcome so as to calculate the average treatment effect.  The way in which the weight is 
specified, will of course influence how the treatment effect is estimated (Cameron & Trivedi, 
2005: 874).  Three methods are used in this paper, namely  
•  Nearest neighbour matching chooses, for each treated unit  , the set of control units 
where the difference in propensity score is minimised (i.e. the “nearest neighbour” to 
the treated unit (Cameron & Trivedi, 2005: 875).   
•  Kernel matching match treated units with a weighted average of all the control units, 
with the weight being inversely proportional to the distance of the propensity score 
of each of the control units to the propensity score of the treated unit (Becker & 
Ichino, 2002: 361). 
•  Radius (or calliper) matching, which matches each treated unit to the control units 
found within a defined radius or calliper.   
3.  Matching Results 
3.1. Estimating the Propensity Score - Model Specification 
The propensity score (i.e. the probability of each child in the sample receiving the CSG) is 
estimated using a linear probability model.  The sample is restricted to only include eligible 
children,  an  approach  which  takes  into  account  the  fact  that  the  similarities  in  the 
covariates of these two groups would potentially assist a greater overlap in the propensity 
scores of treated and control units, as opposed to units from the greater untreated, non-
eligible population.   
As set out above, without the inclusion of the caregiver-motivation variable, the model 
may  not  comply  with  the  conditional  unconfoundedness  assumption  discussed  above 
(Agüero  et  al  2006:22).    Accordingly,  the  variable  was  initially  included  in  the  model.  
However, as a result of the way in which the variable was created, it is a very strong 
predictor  of  treatment  status,  which  causes  the  common  support  assumption  to  be 
violated (and introduces bias from that perspective).  In addition, the balancing property 
does not hold as the caregivers of treated and untreated children have vastly different 
levels of motivation.  The propensity into treatment estimated conditional on caregiver 
motivation is accordingly very different for treated and untreated children, which translates 
into the balancing condition not being complied with.  In other words, caregiver motivation 
will never be similar for units with the same propensity score.  Accordingly the caregiver-
motivation variable was left out of the final model specification.  It should, however, be  
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noted that the inclusion of the caregiver-motivation variable does not have a substantial 
effect on the results reported below. 
Children  whose  caregivers  are  married  are  less  likely  to  receive  the  CSG,  potentially 
because married caregivers have a better support system and are therefore less likely to 
apply for the CSG.  As expected, the age of the child has a significant positive effect on 
whether treatment is received, which enters the model non-linearly.  As for the variables 
controlling  for  household  characteristics,  it  is  only  access  to  a  landline  telephone  and 
having a flush toilet which are statistically significant (both have a negative effect on the 
probability  of  receiving  the  CSG,  as  expected).    In  addition,  the  effect  of  monthly 
household  per  capita  expenditure  has  a  negative  effect  on the  probability  of  receiving 
treatment. 
Table B1 sets out the results of the propensity score estimations using the three samples. 
Table B1: Linear Probability Model estimation of the propensity scores (probability of 
receiving the CSG) 
  Sample 1  Sample 2  Sample 3 
Variable 
Coefficient  Robust 
Standard 
Error 
Coefficient  Robust 
Standard 
Error 





                 
Employed  0.01  0.03  0.02  0.02  0.01  0.03 
Married  -0.05***  0.02  -0.06***  0.02  -0.05***  0.02 
Child Characteristics               
Age  0.09***  0.01  0.04***  0.01  0.09***  0.01 
Age squared  -0.01***  0.00  0.00***  0.00  -0.01***  0.00 
Boy  0.03*  0.02  0.02  0.01  0.03*  0.02 
Household 
Characteristics               
Electricity  0.00  0.02  0.01  0.01  0.00  0.02 
Piped water  0.03  0.02  0.01  0.02  0.03  0.02 
Landline  -0.08**  0.03  -0.04  0.03  -0.08**  0.03 
Flush toilet  -0.11***  0.03  -0.13***  0.02  -0.11***  0.03 
Female head  0.01  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.01  0.02 
Log pc expenditure  -0.03**  0.01  -  -  -0.03**  0.01 
Constant  0.74***  0.08  0.8***  0.03  0.74***  0.08 
Observations  4853  4914  4853 
*Significant at 10% level. 
**Significant at 5% level. 




3.2. Overlap and Region of Common Support 
Before continuing with the estimation of the average treatment effect, it is important to 
confirm  the  existence  of  a  region  of  common  support.    As  indicated  above,  sufficient 
overlap  between  the  estimated  propensity  scores  of  the  treated  and  control  groups  is 
required to ensure that the results are not biased, since the average treatment effect is 
estimated from the observations included in this region of common support.
23 
Although various methods of confirming compliance with this condition have been used in 
the PSM literature, Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008: 45) suggest a visual inspection of the 
density  distribution  of  the  estimated  propensity  scores  of  both  the  treated  and  control 
groups.  Figures B1 to B3 set out the histograms of the propensity scores for both the 
treated and control groups in all three samples.   
A visual inspection of these three figures reveals that the distribution of the propensity 
scores seem to be sufficiently similar between the treated and control groups for the first 
and third sample.  However, the overlap in the second sample appears to be small and 
limited to the region around the top-end of the distribution, which is a possible cause for 
concern.    To  limit  the  possibility  for  bias,  the  treatment  effect  is  evaluated  along  the 
common support for this sample. 
Figure B1: Region of common support for sample 1 
 
   
                                                 
23It is for this reason that the caregiver-motivation variable has been left out of the model, as discussed in 
the previous section.   






Figure B2: Region of common support for sample 2 
 
 
Figure B3: Region of common support for sample 3 
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Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008: 47) discuss a variety of ways in which compliance with the 
balancing condition can be evaluated.  One of these is stratification tests, a method used 
by Dehejia and Wahba (2002).  In terms of this method, all observations are divided into 
strata based on their estimated propensity scores.  Within each stratum, the difference in 
the mean of the covariates of treated and untreated units is assessed using t-tests. 
In the first and third sample, the observations were divided into 8 strata, while the second 
sample was divided into 15 strata.  Table B2 provides an indication of the propensity 
score  balance  within  each  stratum  by  providing  the  mean  propensity  score  within  the 
stratum, the number of treated ad control units as well as the difference in the propensity 
score which, in most cases, is zero).Table B3 provides the t-statistics of the difference 
between  the  covariates  of  treated  and  untreated  children  within  each  stratum  of  each 
sample.   
4.  Estimating the Average Treatment Effect using Different Matching Algorithms 
Last,  the  matching  algorithms  discussed  above  are  now  used  to  estimate  the  average 
treatment effect for each of the outcome variables (using the three samples set out above).  
The results are reported in Table B4. 
The average treatment effect is first estimated by using the nearest neighbour technique.  
Although  there  is  substantial  overlap  between  the  propensity  scores  of  the  treated  and 
control units, the sample of control units is relatively small, and accordingly this technique is 
applied with replacement.  Nearest neighbour matching is conducted so that each treated 
unit is matched to only one control unit (i.e. its “nearest neighbour”) as well as the nearest 10 
units.  The common support option is also selected.   
The  average  treatment  effect  is  next  estimated  using  the  Kernel  matching  technique.  
Matching  is  again  done  with  replacement.    However,  as  set  out  above,  this  technique 
involves a weighted average of all control units to be matched to the treated unit.   
Caliper  matching  is  done  while  specifying  three  different  caliper  sizes  (starting  with  the 
largest specification and then decreasing the size of the caliper).  The advantage of this 
matching method compared to the nearest neighbor method is that is allows control units 
matched to each treated unit to be quite similar to the treated unit.
24  Again, the common 
support condition is imposed.   
                                                 
24There is a trade-off between variance and bias, since calliper matching could potentially provide more 
unbiased results, however at the cost of increased variance since fewer matches are performed (Caliendo 
& Kopeinig, 2008).  
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With the exception of the adult expenditure outcome variable, none of the PSM techniques 
yield  a  significant  average  treatment  effect  for  any  of  the  outcome  variables  under 
consideration (both analytical and bootstrapped standard errors are estimated).  
The average treatment effect of the CSG on expenditure on adult goods, however, seems to 
be significant and robust.  All of the PSM techniques applied estimate a negative effect of 
receipt of the CSG on household expenditure of adult goods per adult.  There are, however, 
reasons why this result should not be taken as conclusive evidence of the effect of the CSG.   
In the first place, all of the reservations mentioned previously regarding the measurement of 
these  expenditure  variables  remain  relevant.    In  addition,  as  indicated  in  the  previous 
section, the region of common support is not very large for this sample, and observations 
seem to be concentrated around the top-end of the distribution.  Accordingly, the number of 
observations used to estimate the average treatment effect for this outcome variable is very 
small.  The concern is therefore that PSM produces biased estimates of the treatment effect. 
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Table B2: Propensity score balance 









1  -  -  -  -  - 
2  0.37  15  11  0.00  0.01 
3  0.54  306  301  -0.01  0.00 
4  0.63  165  243  -0.00  0.00 
5  0.68  176  378  -0.00  0.00 
6  0.73  169  490  0.00  0.00 
7  0.78  181  729  -0.00  0.00 
8  -0.00  284  1398  -0.00  0.00 
Sample 2 
1  -  -  -  -  - 
2  -  -  -  -  - 
3  0.57  14  20  -0.02  0.01 
4  0.66  61  128  0.00  0.00 
5  0.71  37  58  0.00  0.00 
6  0.74  25  115  -0.00  0.00 
7  0.76  30  41  -0.00  0.00 
8  0.77  26  117  0.00  0.00 
9  0.79  36  167  -0.00  0.00 
10  0.83  140  683  0.00  0.00 
11  0.88  179  1276  -0.00  0.00 
12  0.91  87  776  -0.00  0.00 
13  0.93  39  454  -0.00  0.00 
14  0.94  14  337  -0.00  0.00 
15  0.95  8  45  0.00  0.00 
Sample 3 
1  -  -  -  -  - 
2  0.37  15  11  0.00  0.01 
3  0.54  306  301  -0.01  0.00 
4  0.63  165  243  -0.00  0.00 
5  0.68  176  378  -0.00  0.01 
6  0.73  169  490  0.00  0.00 
7  0.78  181  729  -0.00  0.00 





Table B3: Covariate balance 
T-Statistic per Block 
Strata  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15 
Sample 1 
Caregiver Employed  -  0.85  1.04  0.55  0.99  0.61  -0.21  0.09               
Caregiver Married  -  -0.27  -0.83  -2.02  2.44  1.67  0.79  0.28               
Child's Age  -  -0.43  -1.10  -2.19  2.30  0.92  -0.96  1.83               
Child's Age Squared  -  -0.55  -0.88  -1.91  1.90  0.86  -1.02  2.18               
Boy  -  -0.61  -0.24  2.33  1.80  0.15  0.18  -0.29               
Electricity  -  0.00  -0.41  -1.00  1.07  0.49  -0.58  -1.49               
Piped water  -  -0.85  -1.11  -0.55  1.30  -0.28  2.40  0.97               
Landline  -  -0.18  0.51  -0.13  -0.12  1.07  1.11  -0.67               
Flush toilet  -  1.18  -1.05  -1.02  2.31  -0.98  1.28  1.10               
Female head  -  -0.27  0.46  1.23  -1.29  0.02  -0.64  0.74               
Log pc expenditure  -  -0.14  0.71  -0.74  2.14  -0.49  -0.07  0.05               
Sample 2 
Caregiver Employed  -  -  0.00  0.08  0.66  -0.94  0.40  0.11  -0.05  0.48  2.37  0.62  -0.83  -1.50  0.77 
Caregiver Married  -  -  0.28  -0.27  0.11  1.15  0.12  -0.71  -0.75  -0.42  -1.19  0.62  1.27  0.00  0.00 
Child's Age  -  -  0.92  -0.83  1.56  0.20  0.37  2.05  0.27  -0.73  -0.01  0.70  -0.91  -0.34  0.57 
Child's Age Squared  -  -  0.2  -0.88  1.44  -0.20  0.12  1.82  -0.00  -0.19  0.14  0.88  -0.74  -0.45  0.64 
Boy  -  -  -0.68  1.31  1.47  1.40  1.34  1.10  0.81  -0.91  0.13  1.10  0.45  0.77  -1.06 
Electricity  -  -  -0.92  -0.30  0.61  -0.67  0.29  1.20  1.40  -0.12  0.20  -2.17  -1.34  -0.41  0.00 
Piped water  -  -  0.28  -0.32  1.10  1.53  0.30  1.96  1.12  -1.63  0.82  1.57  0.89  -1.12  0.74 
Landline  -  -  1.51  0.88  1.72  0.42  -1.08  -1.63  -0.51  0.61  -0.89  -1.25  -1.03  -0.41  0.00 
Flush toilet  -  -  0.00  0.00  1.39  1.53  1.33  2.26  1.64  -1.95  1.81  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Female head  -  -  0.92  -0.24  0.71  0.32  -1.42  0.89  0.04  -0.18  0.57  -1.67  0.88  0.40  0.60 




Caregiver Employed  -  0.85  1.04  0.55  0.99  0.61  -0.21  0.09               
Caregiver Married  -  -0.27  -0.83  -2.02  2.44  1.67  0.79  0.28               
Child's Age  -  -0.43  -1.08  -2.20  2.30  0.92  -0.96  1.83               
Child's Age Squared  -  -0.55  -0.88  -1.91  1.90  0.86  -1.02  2.18               
Boy  -  -0.61  -0.24  2.33  1.80  0.15  0.18  -0.29               
Electricity  -  0.00  -0.41  -1.01  1.07  0.49  -0.58  -1.49               
Piped water  -  -0.85  -1.11  -0.55  1.30  -0.28  2.40  0.97               
Landline  -  -0.18  0.51  -0.13  -0.12  1.07  1.11  -0.67               
Flush toilet  -  1.18  -1.05  -1.02  2.31  -0.98  1.28  1.08               
Female head  -  -0.28  0.46  1.22  -1.29  0.02  -0.64  0.74               






Table B4: Estimated average treatment effects (standard errors in parenthesis) 
 
  Sample 1  Sample 2  Sample 3 
Matching 
Algorithm 











0.07  -0.02  23.00  -8.99  0.00  -0.00 
(0.07)  (0.12)  (32.11)  (3.97)  (0.01)  (0.03) 
N=3401  N=1738  N=4910  N=922  N=2784  N=2621 




0.05  -0.01  42.46  -9.54  0.00  0.00 
(0.07)  (0.12)  (32.11)  (3.97)  (0.01)  (0.03) 
N=3401  N=1738  N=4910  N=922  N=2741  N=2621 
T=2621  T=1400  T=4213  T=765  T=2117  T=1978 
Kernel  0.03  -0.01  24.38  -9.37  0.01  -0.00 
(0.07)  (0.12)  (32.11)  (3.97)  (0.01)  (0.03) 
N=3403  N=1743  N=4914  N=924  N=2786  N=2623 




0.04  0  25.97  -9.48  0.01  0.00 
(0.07)  (0.12)  (32.11)  (3.97)  (0.01)  (0.03) 
N=3399  N=1741  N=4914  N=922  N=2785  N=2622 




0.04  -0.01  27.26  -7.86  0.01  -0.00 
(0.07)  (0.12)  (32.11)  (3.97)  (0.01)  (0.03) 
N=3322  N=1565  N=4740  N=547  N=2723  N=2559 




0.07  -0.05  28.73  -11.71  0.00  -0.03 
(0.07)  (0.12)  (32.11)  (3.97)  (0.01)  (0.03) 
N=1813  N=644  N=3985  N=398  N=1369  N=1270 
T=1033  T=306  T=3288  T=241  T=702  T=627 
Notes: 
#With replacement. 
All estimations done on the region of common support. 
Bootstrapped standard errors (200 repetitions). 
N=number of observations, T= number of treated observations used in matching 
 